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A Comment on
Separation of Power
By Philip B. Kurland*
I am fattered by the invitation to appear
before the Committee to express my views on
the subjects with which these hearings are concerned. I am, however, fully appreciative of
the fact that when the invitation to speak was
issued to me the Supreme Court had not yet
been called upon to express an authoritative
opinion on the constitutional problems of the
injunctions against the New York Times and
Washington Post. For purposes of advising
you of the law of the Constitution, my own
views, whether in agreement or disagreement
with the Court, are irrelevant.
I would point out, however, that there was
agreement among the litigants in the cases
about the appropriate general principle. That
is, both sides assumed that an injunction could
not issue to prevent publication of the documents unless such publication would be injurious to the nitional security. There was
apparent agreement, too, that such threat to
the national security would be a basis for injunction. The contest was essentially over two
questions. First, what the standard for injury
to the national security should be. Here there
were considerable variations in suggested verbal formulae, with the words substantial, imminent, clear, etc., being offered. It seems evident, however, that no concatenation of words
can afford a precise measure against which the
facts could be placed in order to make a determination. There is no litmus paper test for
danger to national security.
*This paper Is based upon the statement by Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, before
the United States House of Representaties' Committee on
Government Operations, June 30, 1971.

This first question, therefore, gave rise to the
second. Who shall determine whether the proposed publication does ,r does not offend the
standard of national security? The newspapers
seemed to be satisfied that their own judgment
was adequate to the purpose. Those on the
other side thought that a decision reflected in
the stamp on the document should be decisive.
On this score, I would invoke the words of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in another situation where
conflicts between two constitutional commands
had to be resolved. In Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946), he said:
"A free press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom gives it power. Power
in a democracy implies responsibility in its
exercise. No institution in a democracy,
either governmental or private, can have the
limits of power which enforce responsibility
determined by the limited power itself. In
plain English, freedom carries with it responsibility even for the press; freedom of
the press is not a freedom fron responsibility for its exercise. . . ."
The answer must be that the decision is for
the courts to make. And inasmuch as the Government is seeking to invoke the authority of
the judiciary in these cases, it would seem clear
that the burden of persuasion should be on it
to show the danger to the national security by
clear and convincing evidence, evidence sufficiently clear and convincing to overcome the
long-standing, fundamental proposition over
which there is no disagreement, that the press
ought to be free from prior restraint.
I shall, if I may, return briefly to the subject
of the case of New York Times v. United States
in a few minutes but from a different perspective.
The invitation issued to me called for me to
make some observations also on the subject of
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the press privilege not to reveal the sources of
its information. To me, the freedom of the
press to conceal information is of a different
dimension from its right to reveal information.
The argument asserted by the press here is
identical with the claim of the government
that it, too, has a right to secrecy to implement
the other functions that it must carry out.
Both claim, therefore, that their right to conceal information is ancillary to other constitutional rights or powers.
My own view is that there is no constitutional privilege of confidential communication
between the publisher of news and his source
of news. The only testimonial privilege specified by the Constitution is the privilege against
self-incrimination, which is not available to
corporations. All other confidential communications privileges rest either on common-law
origins or statutory provisions.
That is not to say that in particular circumstances the right to silence may not flow from
a constitutional provision. Thus, the Court has
ruled that a membership list of the NAACP
need not be revealed to state authorities where
the resulting injury to members was clear and
the benefit to the state was obscure. So, too,
the right to conceal news sources might be protected, where the reason for compelling their
revelation is not persuasive. The difficulty in
striking a balance is not small. And again, as
in the first situation, the question of who is to
make the decision becomes the important one.
The issue can arise in several settings. First,
there may be an order to produce sources of
information in a judicial proceeding. Second,
the information may be sought by a legislative
body - the present contest between CBS and
the Congress is an example. Third, the data
may be demanded by an executive or administrative agency. It would seem, in each instance,
that in order to secure the information de3

manded or - in the last two cases - injunction

against the demand, the authority of the judicial branch will have to be invoked. And so,
in a lawful society, the resolution of the problems will likely be in that branch.
Again, I should like briefly to return to this
issue in some later remarks.
A more amorphous subject assigned to me
is the question of the executive privilege to
conceal information from the public, from the
legislature, and from the courts. As to the
public, Title 5, sec. 552 of the United States
Code, grants a judicial remedy to compel disclosure by executive departments and agencies, with certain exceptions stated in that section and referred to in the preceding one. The
provisions of sec. 552 place the burden of justifying the refusal of publication on the government agency in question. The exceptions
are rather ill-defined. The ones particularly of
interest in light of the present controversy between the government and the newspapers are
those that provide: "This section does not apply to matters that are - (1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in
the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy; ... (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; . . ." The problem of who

has standing to maintain such an action is one
that is yet to be clearly determined. I respectfully refer you to Congressmen Reid and Morse
for greater expertise in this area.
The statute to which I just referred specifically states that it is not relevant to the right
or power of Congress to secure information
from the executive and administrative agencies. The precedents in the tug-of-wars between Congress and the President over Congress's right to see what the President would
conceal are not judicial ones. Heretofore the
one or the other has prevailed according to the
4

willingness of the one or the other to assert
greater political strength. Where Congress is
prepared to use its power over the purse or the
power to refuse passage of legislation, it can
succeed in securing the information that it
wants. So, too, where the public sentiment is
clearly with it, it may be expected to secure
the information that it wants. Where public
opinion is on the side of the President, or
where his political clout is greater than that
which Congress is prepared to exercise, his concealment of the documents will be successful.
So far as the executive privilege against judicially compelled revelations, we do have a
judicial declaration from the Supreme Court
to guide us. In United States v. Reynolds,

345 U.S. 1 (1953), the Court pointed out in a
footnote: "While claim of executive power to
suppress documents is based more immediately
upon R.S. § 161 . .. [5 U.S.C. § 22], the roots
go much deeper. It is said that R.S. § 161 is
only a legislative recognition of an inherent
executive power which is protected in the constitutional system of separation of power."
Nevertheless, the Court went on to hold that
the determination of the availability of the
privilege to the Government in litigation must
be decided by the courts.
The Court said:
"Judicial experience with the privilege
which protects military and state secrets
has been limited in this country. English
experience has been more extensive, but
still relatively slight compared with other
evidentiary privileges. Nevertheless, the
principles which control the application of
the privilege emerge quite clearly from the
applicable precedents. The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be
lightly invoked. There must be a formal
5

claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by
that officer. The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate
for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.
The latter requirement is the only one which
presents real difficutly....
"Regardless of how it is articulated, some
... formula of compromise must be applied

here. Judicial control over the evidence in
a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice
of executive officers. Yet we will not go so
far as to say that the court may automatically
require a complete disclosure to the judge
before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to
satisfy the court, from all the circumstances
of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged.
When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court
should not jeojardize the security which the
privilege is meant to protect by insisting
upon an examination of the evidence, even
by the judge alone, in chambers."
Perhaps, before unwarranted conclusions are
drawn from the Reynolds case to that of the
New York Times v. United States, it should
be noted that in Reynolds it was the individual and not the government that invoked
the assistance of the court, and that the prerogatives protected by the First Amendment
were not involved in that litigation.
If you will allow me, I should like to suggest
that the problems on which this Committee's
attention is now focused, important as they
6

are, are but symptons of a more serious disease.
There are, to my mind, more fundamental
constitutional questions that underlie those being considered.
The essential scheme of the national Constitution was the limitation of governmental
power. It sought to accomplish this end by
three means. The first was a division of power
between the national government and the
States, a federal system in which the national
government was to have limited and specified
powers. For all practical purposes, federalism
in this country is a thing of the past. Whether
by reason of necessity or desirability or irresponsibility, the national government now has
plenary governmental authority. That is to
say, there is no area of governmental operations that cannot be rationalized as coming
within the national sphere, whether by reason
of the power over commerce or some other
amorphous grant of authority.
The second major principle of limitation on
authority that inheres in the constitutional
scheme is that of separation of powers. It does
not suffice to reject this proposition to point
out that a clean, dear line among the three
branches was never intended and has never
been effectuated. Certainly that is true. But
the essence of the scheme remains, that by dividing governmental authority among three
branches there was to be not only separation
of powers but a system of checks and balances.
Here, too, we are in danger of losing the con.
stitutional protection sought to be afforded.
Since 1933, the executive branch of the government has secured and exercised more and more
power, in part by seiing it, in part by the
failure of the legislative branch to assert itself.
We have reached the stage where an astute foreign observer, Louis Heren, can validly assert:
"I do believe that the modern American
Presidency makes sense as a political system
7

only when it is seen to be a latter-day version
of a British medieval monarchy, and I commend this approach to its loyal American
subjects. Thus armed, they will be less
bothered by the frustrations that usually at.
tend the conventional method of measuring
the incumbent against the constitutional
yardstick.
"... . the main difference between the mod-

ern American President and a medieval
monarch is that there has been a steady increase rather than diminution of his power.
In comparative historical terms the United
States has been moving steadily backward."
The concentration of power in the executive
branch may be sought to be justified by the
criterion of efficiency. Just so, the criterion of
efficiency may justify restraints on the power
of the people to learn what is going on in the
government. A steady concentration of power
even within the executive branch is also a
trend to be noted and - I think - deplored.

And this committee bears no small responsibility for the proposal to bring the various departments of the executive branch under a
handful of cabinet commanders, presumably
on the model that Napoleon so successfully
used. The Presidential reorganization plan
will thus bring more and more power into
fewer and fewer hands. (The examples afforded by the Department of Defense and
HEW do not suggest to me that departmental
conglomeration leads to efficiency.)
That such concentration of power is inconsistent with the original constitutional scheme,
I have no doubts. As Professor Andrew
McLaughlin once noteft:
"If it be asked why people were so unwise

-

and the question is often asked - as

to hamper government by division of authority and by checks and balances, the answer is simple: such was the kind of gov8

ernment the leaders and probably men in
general wanted. Who are a free people?
Those who live under a government so constitionally checked as to make life, liberty
and property secure. That would have been
the most explicit answer of the Revolutionary days. . . ."
The third limitation on government authority that was the essence of the Constitution was
a list of restraints on the national government
included, not only in the Bill of Rights, but in
other provisions of the Constitution as well;
none so important, however, as those contained in the First Amendment.
I recite these commonplaces to you because
I think that they are relevant to the issues before you. Since John Marshall used the "necessary and proper" clause to expand the national authority in the Bank case (McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)), it has generally been regarded as a device for the allocation of power between the nation and the
states. A reading of its provisions suggests that
it is at least as relevant to the division of authority within the national government itself.
The provision, as you may recall, reads: "The
Congress shall have Power . . . To make all

Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."
(Emphasis added.)
It becomes clear to me, therefore, that to the
extent that Congress is still aviable institution,
it can enact legislation which in effect says that
the courts shall not be permitted to enjoin
publication by newspapers even of materials
purloined from the national government. Congress cannot derogate from the protections afforded by the First Amendment, but it can add
9

to them. It can legislate the circumstances and
conditions under which the press may assert
the privilege to conceal its sources of information. It can, I think, even legislate the terms
and conditions under which the executive privilege may be asserted for the protection of the
national interests. Certainly there are balancing factors to be taken into consideration in
the enactment of such legislation. Congress
may decide that there are times when an injunction against publication - when permitted
by the Constitution - should be proper. Congress may decide that there are situations under which the executive branch should be
allowed the confidentiality of communications
that most enterprises - even governmental enterprises - need in order to operate successfully.
I think that the real problem is that Congress cannot - because of the way it is organized - or will not, for whatever reason,
undertake the duties that are ascribed to it by
the Constitution. (I would require all Congressmen to read Wilson's Congressional Gov-

ernment, to show them what role Congress
once played in our governmental scheme.) After the "crisis" of the Pentagon papers recedes
into the past, I expect that Congress will continue to condone Presidential actions that find
no warrant in Congressional legislation. We
will continue, for example, to see the President
wage war without Congressional declaration,
to see executive orders substitute for legislation, to see secret executive agreements substitute for treaties, and to see Presidential decisions not to carry out Congressional programs under the label of "impoundment of
funds." I suggested several years ago that the
failure of Congress proves or will prove the
failure of democracy. And I still think that
the danger is nothing less than that.
Meanwhile, I would point out, that the
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failure of Congress to exercise its powers of
supervision over the execution of the laws that
it purportedly enacts makes it all the more important that the news media be kept free to do
so. For if Congress is less and less concerned
about what the executive branch is doing, it
behooves the press - in the largest sense of
that word - to assume the watchdog function.
I expect that I have more than tried your
patience with this tirade. And so without explicit injunction I cease and desist from further imposition on your generosity. I should,
however, be happy to answer - or to try to
answer - any questions that you may wish to
put to me.
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